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The Gentrification Trigger
AUTONOMY, MOBILITY, AND AFFIRMATIVELY
FURTHERING FAIR HOUSING
Rachel D. Godsil†
INTRODUCTION
Gentrification polarizes. The term usually connotes a
process where “outsiders” move into an area whose onceattractive properties have now deteriorated due to disinvestment.
The outsiders moving in are often, though not always, white.1
This migration can lead to arguably positive outcomes. Increased
demand results in an increase in property values—which, from a
pure market perspective, seems like a net positive. Indeed, those
who currently own property acquire greater equity, and the tax
base of the city containing the gentrified neighborhoods expands.
Moreover, gentrification of affluent outsiders would seem also to
further society’s collective interest in residential integration.
Residential integration has enormous potential to address
inequalities of other sorts, such as education, access to job
networks, and an increase in amenities resulting from the
political capital of the outsiders.2 This too seems like a
significant net positive.
Why then is there significant opposition to gentrification
by in-place residents?3 One concern is the possibility that the
†

Eleanor Bontecou Professor of Law, Seton Hall University School of Law;
J.D., University of Michigan Law School, 1992. I would like to thank the participants
in the 2012 Brooklyn Law School Trager Symposium for their thoughtful comments on
earlier drafts of this essay as well as john powell and Michelle Adams for their
intellectual inspiration. Seton Hall University School of Law assisted this project with
a summer research grant.
1
See, e.g., john a. powell & Marguerite L. Spencer, Giving Them the Old
“One-Two”: Gentrification and the K.O. of Impoverished Urban Dwellers of Color, 46
HOW. L.J. 433 (2003).
2
Michelle Adams, Radical Integration, 94 CALIF. L. REV. 261, 303-05 (2006).
3
JACOB L. VIGDOR, DOES GENTRIFICATION HARM THE POOR? 1 (Sept. 2001)
available at http://www.marealtors.com/content/upload/AssetMgmt/Documents/Gov%
20Affairs/QoL/doesgentrificationharmthepoor.pdf (noting the negative reaction to
gentrification, quoting a mayoral candidate in San Francisco who pledged in 1999 to
declare “war on any and all gentrification”); cf. LANCE FREEMAN, THERE GOES THE
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property-price increase will result in displacement—building
owners will drastically increase rents or the increase in taxes may
become too great for current property owners to bear.4 There is
some dispute as to the degree of direct displacement of individuals
due to gentrification (that is, evictions, failure to pay property
taxes),5 but it is clearly the case that the economic and racial
demographics of gentrifying neighborhoods often change
dramatically.6
In-place residents fear that the newcomers will change
the culture and practices of the neighborhood. According to one
caricature, “Housing prices balloon; boutiques and bistros
blossom; and before you know it, some bearded dudes in vests
have bought the local bodega and opened a saloon festooned
with taxidermied animals.”7 While the caricatured image may
be considered funny, the perceived loss to the in-place residents
is not. Indeed, the pain of loss of community and the harm of
lost autonomy have been well recognized in the eminent
domain literature.8
Nevertheless, some commenters contest the idea that
in-place residents of gentrifying neighborhoods suffer a loss.
These scholars suggest that in-place residents should be
grateful for the influx of affluent residents and the capital they
bring.9 Indeed, one could argue that gentrification has been the
means by which our cities have avoided their predicted
demise—for at various points during the twentieth century,
scholars and public intellectuals have professed the “death” of
the city and the “urban crisis.”10 Therefore, if gentrification is
‘HOOD: VIEWS OF GENTRIFICATION FROM THE GROUND UP 4 (2006) (examining
gentrification in Harlem and Clinton Hill in Brooklyn and finding no causal
relationship between displacement and gentrification; rather, finding that the poor and
those without a college degree are more likely to remain in a gentrified neighborhood).
4
powell & Spencer, supra note 1, at 446.
5
See FREEMAN, supra note 3, at 167; Lance Freeman & Frank Braconi,
Gentrification and Displacement, 8 URB. PROSPECT 1, 2 (2002), available at
http://www.chpcny.org.
6
See, e.g., VICKI BEEN ET AL., FURMAN CTR. FOR REAL ESTATE & URBAN
POLICY, STATE OF NEW YORK CITY’S HOUSING AND NEIGHBORHOODS (2011), available at
http://furmancenter.org/files/sotc/SOC_2011.pdf.
7
Adam Sternbergh, What’s Wrong with Gentrification, N.Y. MAG. (Dec. 11,
2011), http://nymag.com/news/intelligencer/62675.
8
See, e.g., Rachel D. Godsil & David V. Simunovich, Protecting Status: The
Mortgage Crisis, Eminent Domain, and the Ethic of Home Ownership, 77 FORDHAM L.
REV. 949, 978 (2008).
9
See, e.g., J. Peter Byrne, Rhetoric and Realities of Gentrification: Reply to
powell and Spencer, 46 HOW. L.J. 491, 494-95 (2003).
10
See, e.g., Bruce London & J. John Palen, Introduction: Some Theoretical and
Practical Issues Regarding Inner-City Revitalization, in GENTRIFICATION, DISPLACEMENT
AND NEIGHBORHOOD REVITALIZATION 4 (J. John Palen & Bruce London eds., 1984).
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understood as a market-driven mechanism that allows those
with definable property interests to maximize the value of
those interests, then our property system is working as it
should. Although the result is increased rent—which may
prevent some from remaining in gentrified areas—to many
property scholars the degree of protection should increase with
the significance of the property interest. A lease holder’s
interest ends at the end of the lease. So while renters whose
lease terms change may wish to remain, the interests of the fee
simple holders in the gentrifying neighborhood are the only
interests that matter from a legal perspective. And those who
own their property have a choice either to remain or sell their
properties for a significantly higher price.
But not all adhere to this alluringly simple formulation.
Many commentators argue that property rights in the fee title
holder are far from absolute and that the “public,” however
constituted, has an interest in how land—private as well as
public—is used. Indeed, when issues of land use changes arise,
laws and regulations often provide particular protection to
those considered part of the “community,” suggesting that
realizing “community preferences” should be among the goals
that public land use controls seek to achieve.
Yet even among those who agree that the public has an
interest in land use controls and that community preferences
should be weighed particularly heavily, it is far from obvious
what degree of intervention these propositions support and
who constitutes the community whose preferences we seek to
anticipate and realize.
Also salient is why community preferences ought to be
important and what values we seek to recognize and conserve
in honoring them. Without delving too deeply, I note that one of
the foremost values legal recognition of private property seeks
to serve is autonomy.11 Autonomy is understood as critical to
the successful implementation of a liberal democracy—which
relies upon its citizens to be active participants in governance.
11

See D. Benjamin Barros, Property and Freedom, 4 N.Y.U. J. L. & LIBERTY
36, 37 (2009) (citing e.g., JAMES M. BUCHANAN, PROPERTY AS A GUARANTOR OF LIBERTY
(1993); JAMES W. ELY, JR., THE GUARDIAN OF EVERY OTHER RIGHT: A CONSTITUTIONAL
HISTORY OF PROPERTY RIGHTS (1992); RICHARD PIPES, PROPERTY AND FREEDOM (1999);
BERNARD H. SIEGAN, PROPERTY AND FREEDOM: THE CONSTITUTION, THE COURTS, AND
LAND-USE REGULATION (1997)). Two prominent works that justify property on the basis
that it promotes individual freedom, both of which are discussed at length infra Part II,
are Charles A. Reich, The New Property, 73 YALE L.J. 733 (1964) and MILTON
FRIEDMAN, CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM (1962).
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The voluminous discussions of how private property overcomes
the tragedy of the commons12 also provide some underpinning
to autonomy’s importance. If we hold land in common, the
theory suggests, decision making about the land’s uses becomes
too disaggregated and the incentives to hoard too powerful for
the commons holders to maximize the value of land.13 By
contrast, legally protected private-property rights are said to
incentivize the individual property holder to maximize the
value of her land through sound land use choices.14
The notion of granting communities a say in land use
decisions may seem anathema to autonomy—it suggests that
the “many” will be able to dictate uses to the individual
property owner. And yet, this sort of interference occurs with
great frequency—zoning being perhaps the most obvious
example. Nevertheless, in some contexts, autonomy interests
are at stake that existing legal tools fail to protect.
In this article, I focus on the gentrification of city
neighborhoods that were abandoned during the governmentsponsored suburban migration of the 1950s through the
1980s.15 These neighborhoods generally became racially isolated
and economically depressed during this same period. The
residents who remained did not choose to have the middle class
abandon their neighborhoods, nor did they have the option to
leave for themselves.16 Now, after decades where those who
remained invested labor, time, and emotion in their
neighborhoods,17 outsiders are moving in, and the residents who
remained (or their descendants) are denied both the autonomy
to prevent these changes and the means to exit to more desired
environs. Accordingly, I argue in favor of broadening our
conception of “interest” beyond those who hold definable
property interests in the classic sense to include those who
have invested in their homes and neighborhoods.18
Although the notion of realizing community interests
would seem to privilege in-place residents’ interests, and thus
counsel against any further gentrification, this view wrongly
12

See, e.g., Garret Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCIENCE 1243
(1968); Barton H. Thompson, Jr., Tragically Difficult: The Obstacles to Governing the
Commons, 30 ENVTL. L. 241 (2000).
13
Hardin, supra note 12, at 1244-45.
14
Id. at 1245.
15
See infra notes 26-33 and accompanying text.
16
See infra notes 30-35 and accompanying text.
17
See DEBBIE BECHER, THE INVESTMENT STATE: EVERYDAY ENCOUNTERS
WITH EMINENT DOMAIN (forthcoming 2013) (manuscript at 9) (on file with the author).
18
Id.
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assumes that the goal of realizing community preferences
requires compositional stasis. Compositional stasis, needless to
say, is neither possible nor normatively appealing. Residential
change in neighborhoods is inevitable whether a neighborhood
gentrifies or not.19 The problem, however, is that gentrification
currently causes nonconsensual exit—and, as such, threatens
the autonomy of the displaced in a way that is unlike a choice
to move. But, by recognizing a broad scope of community
preferences, the autonomy of in-place residents can be revived.
The question that follows is how to protect the
preferences of in-place residents. Often, these preferences are
assumed to be simply to prevent gentrification from occurring.
However, decrying or opposing gentrification is unlikely to halt
the process of willing buyers purchasing property from willing
sellers at increasing prices—which begins the cycle of
gentrification. Nor will blanket opposition successfully ignite
changes that confront the underlying challenges to autonomy
and community that animate the deeply felt response to
gentrification. A more nuanced approach is required.
Many in-place residents—particularly renters—currently
lack the ability to choose to remain when gentrification occurs.
The forced exit of sizable numbers of community members is
harmful both to them and to those who remain. The ideal
response, as this article describes, is a vehicle that allows inplace residents to remain but also allows them to choose whether
to leave, rather than being involuntarily displaced. Such a
vehicle would seem to blunt the criticism that gentrification is
an illegitimate invasion by outsiders, and it would transform
gentrification into a mechanism by which truly fair housing
can be furthered.
This article, inspired by eminent domain remedies and
federal government mobility programs operated by the
Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD), suggests
the possibility of using rental vouchers or low-interest loans to
restore the autonomy of in-place residents, providing them with
viable, self-determining options to remain or exit the
neighborhood. Indeed, the Fair Housing Act legally obligates HUD
and its grantees to “affirmatively further fair housing,”20 and HUD
19

Indeed, poor residents are more likely to move than wealthy residents, and
therefore, there is often more residential change in poor neighborhoods than
“gentrified” neighborhoods. FREEMAN, supra note 3, at 4-5; SULEIMAN OSMAN, THE
INVENTION OF BROWNSTONE BROOKLYN: GENTRIFICATION AND THE SEARCH FOR
AUTHENTICITY IN POSTWAR NEW YORK 276 (2011).
20
Fair Housing Act of 1968, 42 U.S.C. § 3608.
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has funds available to fulfill this mandate. The current absence of
true autonomy and choice for in-place residents of gentrifying
neighborhoods threatens the legitimacy of any integration that
may occur as a result of the influx of new residents.
This article is divided into two sections. Part I explains
why gentrification is different from other neighborhood changes,
arguing that the cause and effect of modern gentrification
weighs in favor of government intervention. Part II argues that
the existing land use legal toolkit is unavailable to in-place
residents facing gentrification and offers alternative legal
mechanisms to protect community interests. This section
specifically examines the circumstances that would trigger
government intervention and discusses the HUD funds available
to implement these proposals.
I.

WHY IS GENTRIFICATION DIFFERENT?

Many neighborhoods undergo significant change. A
suburban neighborhood of small homes will become popular,
and individuals with greater resources will purchase the homes
with the goal of tearing them down and rebuilding on a
significantly grander scale. A small town will see an influx of
chain stores that threaten extant businesses as well as the
distinctive culture of the town.
Like gentrification, these changes are often hotly
contested by residents other than the individual property owner
who stands to benefit from the change. The “community” prefers
the existing scale of homes over McMansions, and it prefers a
certain aesthetic that the signage and visual impact of chain
stores will disrupt. But this opposition to change differs in two
respects from the opposition associated with gentrification.
First, there is a strong argument to be made that our legal
system has adequate mechanisms in place, such as zoning and
subdevelopment
permitting
requirements,
to
address
community interests in the context of a suburb or small town.21
Second, as discussed in greater detail below, the inplace residents in neighborhoods subject to gentrification
consider their neighborhoods to have been intentionally
abandoned and allowed to deteriorate by both governmental
actors and the forebears of the people now seeking to “gentrify.”
The in-place residents who oppose gentrification tend to be
21

See infra notes 62-71.
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residents who lived through the period of abandonment and
deterioration—or their children. For in-place residents, then,
the notion that they will be displaced now has an extreme—
and often racialized—resonance.
A.

Defining Gentrification

Gentrification generally refers to a process where a
once-affluent area, which has been abandoned and is now
occupied by working-class or poor people, is rediscovered by the
affluent. Typically, neighborhoods that are gentrified possess
the following characteristics at a particular point in time:
deteriorating housing, generally low property values, high
crime, few amenities, and substandard schools.22
The term “gentrification,” perhaps not surprisingly, was
initially used in England by sociologist Ruth Glass in the mid1960s to describe changes in coastal villages and London
neighborhoods.23 Glass’s interest stemmed from the changes she
observed initially in her own London neighborhood as Victorian
lodging houses were rehabilitated and sold to single families,
displacing the working-class renters.24 Her characterization of
the phenomenon of an upgrading housing stock and the influx
of higher income homeowners is now the common
nomenclature and is used internationally in both academic
literature and cultural conversation.
The popularity of the term is interesting since “gentry”
is a descriptor rarely used in the United States; it refers to a
class status—landed aristocracy or nobility—that was
expressly rejected by the Founding Fathers, even if some lived
lives that closely replicated this class.25 And despite the rare
use of the term, the phenomenon is the same in the United
States, where gentrification is used to describe the “process of
upper-status groups replacing lower-status groups in inner-city
neighborhoods that had previously experienced ‘decline.’”26

22

Tom Slater, Gentrification of the City, in THE NEW BLACKWELL COMPANION
573 (Gary Bridge & Sophie Watson eds., 2011).
London & Palen, supra note 10, at 7.
Slater, supra note 22, at 571.
Id.
London & Palen, supra note 10, at 7.

TO THE CITY 572,
23
24
25
26
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Who Lives in Gentrifying Neighborhoods and What Level
of Autonomy Do They Have?

In the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries in
the United States, the neighborhoods ripe for gentrification are
most often inhabited by black and Latino families and individuals
in urban areas.27 The phenomenon is not race specific, however,
and can occur wherever poor and working-class residents live in
neighborhoods possessing certain characteristics.28 The unifying
features of neighborhoods likely to be subject to gentrification are
a high rate of renters, housing stocks with high architectural
value, ease of access to job centers, vibrant culture and street life,
comparatively low housing prices, and perhaps ironically, racial
and ethnic diversity.29
The arguable difference between the first wave of
gentrification—where artists and bohemians, followed by the
middle and upper class, moved into neighborhoods at one time
comprised of white ethnics—and the second—where the
affluent are moving into neighborhoods that have become
predominantly Black and Latino—is the role of choice or
autonomy available to the in-place residents. Some white
ethnics had options to remain in gentrifying neighborhoods—
and often saw their property values increase exponentially—
while others migrated to the suburbs.
The story of white ethnics’ migration to the suburbs is an
old one—as is the resultant abandonment and disinvestment of
urban centers to blacks and Latinos.30 White ethnic groups and
new white immigrant groups in the early twentieth century were
likely to congregate in neighborhoods with others who shared
their origins; however, most neighborhoods contained multiple
ethnic groups. More significant, the children of white ethnic

27

MAUREEN KENNEDY & PAUL LEONARD, DEALING WITH NEIGHBORHOOD
CHANGE: A PRIMER ON GENTRIFICATION AND POLICY CHOICES 2 (Apr. 2001), available at
http://www.policylink.org/atf/cf/%7B97C6D565-BB43-406D-A6D5-ECA3BBF35AF0%
7D/DealingWithGentrification_final.pdf.
28
See, e.g., Justyna Goworowska, Gentrification, Displacement in the Ethnic
Neighborhood of Greenpoint Brooklyn 5-6 (2008) (unpublished M.A. thesis, University
of Oregon), available at https://scholarsbank.uoregon.edu/jspui/bitstream/1794/7764/
1/Goworowska_Justyna_MA_spring2008.pdf.
29
KENNEDY & LEONARD, supra note 27, at 9-12; see also generally JANE
JACOBS, THE DEATH AND LIFE OF GREAT AMERICAN CITIES (1961) (a classic account of
the harm of suburban homogeneity, top-down planning, and a celebration of mixed use
land use patterns which create dynamic and diverse communities).
30
See, e.g., DOUGLAS S. MASSEY & NANCY A. DENTON, AMERICAN APARTHEID:
SEGREGATION AND THE MAKING OF THE UNDERCLASS 77 (1993).
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immigrants typically assimilated quickly and purchased homes
outside of the “ethnic ghetto,” usually within a generation or two.31
The experience of black people in the Northeast and
Midwest and Latinos in the West was different in kind. Rather
than being able to enjoy the social mobility granted to white
ethnics, “blacks were trapped behind an increasingly
impermeable color line.”32 This trap was double-edged. Black
families were prevented from moving to the suburbs or white
neighborhoods within cities and simultaneously denied resources
to maintain the inner-city neighborhoods abandoned by whites.33
Black families (and Latinos in the West) were denied
housing choice through both legal and extralegal means. The
extralegal barriers consisted of the once-tolerated and nowdeplored harassment and violence that arose when a black
family sought to move to a white neighborhood.34 The legal
barriers consisted of the use of racially restrictive covenants as
well as “exclusionary” zoning that created significant class
barriers to suburban migration.35 In the 1940s, the real estate
31

See Rachel D. Godsil, Viewing the Cathedral from Behind the Color Lines:
Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Environmental Racism, 53 EMORY L.J. 1807, 1840
(2004); MASSEY & DENTON, supra note 30, at 32. For example, in what was referred to
as the “Irish ghetto,” the majority of the residents were not, in fact, Irish, and only 3%
of Chicago’s Irish population lived there. MASSEY & DENTON, supra note 30, at 33. By
contrast, in the black ghetto, blacks constituted 82% of the population and 93% of
Chicago’s black population lived there. Id. at 32-33; see STANLEY LIEBERSON, ETHNIC
PATTERNS IN AMERICAN CITIES 44-58, 182-90 (1963) (providing a rich description of the
residential movement of different white ethnic groups).
32
MASSEY & DENTON, supra note 30, at 33.
33
Godsil, supra note 31, at 1838-40.
34
Id. at 1840. The violence took the form of harassment of black families who
moved into white neighborhoods that sporadically escalated into rock throwing, gun
shots, cross burnings, and physical attack. Id. If the black family refused to move, the
last step was bombing. Id. In Chicago, a black home in a white neighborhood was
bombed once every twenty days between 1917 and 1921—in all, fifty-eight homes were
bombed. Id. at 35. This violence recurred during the Civil Rights Movement’s attempt
to open housing. In the “Open Housing Campaign” that was waged in Chicago in the
summer of 1966, marchers in working class white neighborhoods were confronted by
[w]hites shouting “white power!” [who] threw bricks and bottles at the
marchers, striking civil rights leader Jesse Jackson and injuring more than
fifty demonstrators. When marchers made for the cars they had left in the
park under police supervision they found that two had been pushed into the
lagoon, over ten had been set on fire, and many more had broken windows
and slashed tires . . . .
Sarah Asrat & Philip Tegeler, Poverty & Race Research Action Council, Launching the
Fair Housing Debate: A Closers Look at the 1966 Chicago Freedom Movement (2005),
PRRAC.ORG, available at http://prrac.org/full_text.php?text_id=1047&item_id=9645&
newsletter_id=0&header=Current%20ProjectsSeparationofPowers.
35
Godsil, supra note 31, at 1843, 1864. Racially restrictive covenants
typically prohibited property owners from selling, occupying, or leasing their property.
Porter v. Johnson, 115 S.W.2d 529 (Mo. Ct. App. 1938). Of course the Supreme Court

328

BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 78:2

industry actively and successfully promoted the use of racially
restrictive covenants.36 A standard covenant stated that a
property “shall not be used or occupied by any person or
persons except those of the Caucasian race.”37 In certain areas,
“restrictive racial covenants were inserted in [as many as]
eighty percent of . . . deeds.”38 Civil rights groups brought legal
challenges to restrictive covenants, and enforcement of such
covenants was held to be unconstitutional in 1948.39 Despite the
successful legal challenge, the covenants often remained an
impediment to housing choice for blacks and Latinos because
white homeowners continued to honor them and many
contractors found it impossible to obtain financing to build
homes in newly developing suburban subdivisions for minority
residents.40 Realtors were also reluctant to violate deed
restrictions for fear of “risk[ing] the wrath of . . . homeowners
and jeopardiz[ing] their businesses.”41
In addition to express racial restrictions, other covenants
regulating the size and aesthetics of new homes also had the
effect of excluding many black and Latino families.42 These
restrictions—which included preventing the construction of
multifamily housing, requiring large lots and square footage, and
specifying architectural standards—“subtly preserved social
homogeneity”43 but were rarely challenged with success in courts.44

held that the enforcement of racially restrictive covenants was unconstitutional in
Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U.S. 60 (1917). The Court decided this case not on equality
grounds, but rather on property rights grounds: “The right which the ordinance
annulled was the civil right of a white man to dispose of his property . . . to a person of
color, and of a colored person to make such a disposition to a white person.” Buchanan,
245 U.S. at 81; see also Jon C. Dubin, From Junkyards to Gentrification: Explicating a
Right to Protective Zoning in Low-Income Communities of Color, 77 MINN. L. REV. 739,
776 (1993). They were also used in some areas against Jews, Catholics, and the Irish.
See KAREN BRODKIN, HOW JEWS BECAME WHITE FOLKS AND WHAT THAT SAYS ABOUT
RACE IN AMERICA 47-48 (1998). However, their use was most widespread against
blacks. See generally THOMAS LEE PHILPOTT, THE SLUM AND THE GHETTO:
NEIGHBORHOOD DETERIORATION AND MIDDLE-CLASS REFORM, CHICAGO, 1880–1930, at
189-93 (1978).
36
See THOMAS J. SUGRUE, THE ORIGINS OF THE URBAN CRISIS: RACE AND
INEQUALITY IN POSTWAR DETROIT 44 (1996).
37
Id.
38
Abraham Bell & Gideon Parchomovsky, The Integration Game, 100
COLUM. L. REV. 1965, 1978 (2000).
39
See Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 19-23 (1948) (holding that judicial
enforcement of racially restrictive covenants constituted impermissible state action
violating the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment).
40
SUGRUE, supra note 36, at 45; Godsil, supra note 31, at 1844.
41
SUGRUE, supra note 36, at 45.
42
SUGRUE, supra note 36, at 45; Godsil, supra note 31, at 1848.
43
SUGRUE, supra note 36, at 45.
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As a result of these legal and extralegal mechanisms,
blacks and Latinos were forced to remain in urban centers and did
not have the choice to transition to suburban living. Thus, an
unwilling population continued to inhabit the urban neighborhoods
that are now desirable as people begin to choose city living again
and seek affordable properties in emerging neighborhoods.
C.

The Role of Government in Property-Value Decline in
Urban Communities

If gentrification occurs when an area experiences
increased property values as a result of outsiders who identify
undervalued property, it is important, as a preliminary matter,
to note what caused the initial undervaluation. If the causes of
decline and renewal are simply a result of individual preferences
and consensual market exchanges, the argument in favor of a
laissez-faire approach seems strong. It is exceedingly clear,
however, that in the context of urban neighborhoods, declining
property values are a direct consequence of decisions made by
the federal government, bankers, and real estate brokers.45
Historian Thomas Sugrue has shown that the boundaries
between these three groups were blurred as bankers, real estate
executives, and developers moved back and forth from
government service to private practice.46 The private hand of the
market was consciously manipulated to cause a decline in
property values and the quality of life in urban neighborhoods.
From the post-World War II period through the 1970s,
the federal government engaged in programs enhancing the
autonomy of white families to purchase homes and move to the
suburbs, while simultaneously disinvesting in urban centers
and contributing to the exclusion of black and Latino families
from those same suburbs. In particular, three federal programs
combined to provide unprecedented opportunities and
autonomy for even middle-class white families: the federal
subsidization of highways, the Federal Housing Administration
(FHA), and the Veterans Administration (VA) home ownership
loan programs. Moreover, some of these same programs
resulted in massive displacement of poor people and the
destruction of established neighborhoods.
44

Cf. S. Burlington Cnty. NAACP v. Twp. of Mt. Laurel, 336 A.2d 713 (N.J.),
appeal dismissed and cert. denied, 423 U.S. 808 (1975).
45
SUGRUE, supra note 36, at 43.
46
Id.
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In every major city, highway construction destroyed
working-class neighborhoods as homes were leveled to make
way for expressways, on and off ramps, and overpasses.47 These
neighborhoods were comprised of many ethnic groups; however,
the white ethnics were able to benefit from the highway
construction because it enabled easy commutes to and from the
suburbs.48
These moves to the suburbs were subsidized by the
government through the FHA and VA loan programs.49 These
loan programs guaranteed loans made by private banks to
prospective homebuyers, allowing new buyers to purchase
homes with only a 10-percent down payment. Before the advent
of the federal programs, banks generally required “at least 33%
and often 50% down payment.”50 The federal programs also
allowed buyers twenty-five- to thirty-year repayment periods,
lowering monthly payments significantly.51 Finally, the loan
guarantee reduced risk to banks and thus resulted in lower
interest rates. “The combination of lower down payments,
lower interest rates, and longer repayment periods made home
ownership a ‘mass phenomenon for the first time in American
history.’”52
This phenomenon did not extend to black and Latino
families. The Federal Home Loan Bank Board, working with real
estate brokers and lenders, created Residential Security Maps
and Surveys to determine eligibility for mortgage guarantees and
home loans.53 These maps subdivided metropolitan areas into
sections ranked from A (which were shown on the map as green)
to D (which were shown as red), with green as the safest
investment and red as the riskiest.54 The rankings took into
account indicators such as the age and condition of buildings
and the amenities in the neighborhood. But most important in
the classification “was the level of racial, ethnic, and economic
47

See Mike Jones, Public Roads: We’re on the Eve of Construction, 62 PUB.
ROADS, Nov. 1998, available at http://www.fhwa.dot.gov/publications/research/.../
pavements/.../publicroads/98novdec/eve.cfm (discussing the displacement of families by
federally funded highway projects).
48
Godsil, supra note 31, at 1846-47.
49
The National Housing Act of 1937 created the FHA program. “[T]he VA
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homogeneity,” and whether the neighborhood contained “a
lower grade population.”55 In other words, the mere presence of
black and Latino residents caused a neighborhood to be
considered high risk and coded red. This practice led to the
term “redlining.”56
The effect of the redlining was acute. Residents in
neighborhoods ranked C or D were unable to obtain loans
either to purchase or upgrade their homes, and developers had
great difficulty finding financial support for building in such
neighborhoods.57 For example, FHA lending in suburban Long
Island was approximately sixty times greater than in the
Bronx and eleven times greater than in Brooklyn.58 Redlining
also prevented black and Latino families from obtaining
financing for homes in suburban neighborhoods—lest the
neighborhood in which they sought to purchase become
heterogeneous and thus subject to a C or D ranking. FHA
redlining practices sometimes resulted in whole cities being
“declared ineligible” for FHA-guaranteed loans because of their
minority presence.59 Indeed, in 1966, the FHA had no loans at
all in the city of Camden.60 The FHA redlining policies were not
income-based; middle-income blacks and Latinos were also
denied loan guarantees. The result was a massive capital
disinvestment in inner cities. The lack of mortgage capital in
minority communities made it exceedingly difficult for people
to sell or repair their homes, causing a downward spiral of
“disrepair, deterioration, vacancy, and abandonment.”61
The federal government did not act alone. Decisions
about where to place highways and other unwanted land
uses—such as the concentration of large public housing
projects—all were made at the local level.62 The central role of
government in creating the deteriorating conditions that now
lend themselves to gentrification and reduced autonomy for inplace residents suggests that it is appropriate for the
government to now play a role in addressing gentrification and
enhancing such autonomy.
55

Id. at 44.
Godsil, supra note 31, at 1849.
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See SUGRUE, supra note 36, at 44; Godsil, supra note 31, at 1849.
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Explaining the Racialized Opposition to Gentrification

Prominent civil rights scholars who promote racial and
economic housing integration simultaneously critique
gentrification.63 In light of the fact that gentrification has led to
greater racial and economic heterogeneity in neighborhoods,
this opposition may seem paradoxical. Once gentrification is
contextualized as part of the continuum that includes exclusion
from suburbs, denial of resources, and white abandonment of
cities, the paradox is explained. Gentrification of predominantly
black and Latino neighborhoods, like housing discrimination
and exclusion, denies autonomy to the in-place residents.
Accordingly, the housing patterns that result are not
experienced as “integration,” but instead like an invasion.64 In
an article entitled Gentrification; Personal Reflections, reporter
Julianne Malveaux asks, “Will those who see the neighborhood
as gleaming and upscale now try to get rid of others who see
the neighborhood, simply, as the place where they live and
survive?”65 Scholars assert that “gentrification has a very clear
racial component,”66 some using language such as “ethnic
cleansing” to refer to change in racial composition of places
such as Maxwell Street in Chicago.67 In the city of Oakland, 75
percent of those evicted since 1998 have been people of color—
and the eviction rate rose 300 percent.68 Dramatic changes in
racial composition can also be found in neighborhoods in
Brooklyn, Washington, D.C., and Minneapolis over the last
decade.69 Particularly distressing is the argument that
gentrification that displaces poor people of color has been
encouraged by federal housing policy and can be likened to
reverse redlining, as financing has allowed newcomers to
purchase in inner-city neighborhoods.70
The history of displacement helps explain why the influx
of whites to urban neighborhoods is less likely to be seen as a
63

Compare john a. powell, Living and Learning: Linking Housing and
Education, 80 MINN. L. REV. 749, 758 (1996), with powell & Spencer, supra note 1, passim.
64
See powell & spencer, supra note 1, at 456-57.
65
Id. at 433 (quoting Julianne Malveaux, Malveaux at Large: Gentrification;
Personal Reflections, SUN REPORTER, Aug. 23, 2001, at 6) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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Id. at 436.
67
Id. at 438.
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Id.
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Id. at 437-38; see also VICKI BEEN ET AL., FURMAN CTR. FOR REAL ESTATE &
URBAN POLICY, STATE OF NEW YORK CITY’S HOUSING & NEIGHBORHOODS 2010, at 61,
65 (2010).
70
powell & Spencer, supra note 1, at 453.
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promising new advent of integration. Residents of urban
neighborhoods lived through the experience of neighborhood
decline as their white neighbors moved to the suburbs—an option
unavailable to them. The move of suburbanites back to cities may
be seen as continuing a cycle in which others exercise autonomy,
while poor people of color often lack a corresponding choice.
II.

LEGAL MECHANISMS TO PROTECT COMMUNITY INTERESTS

If the in-place residents of a small town or suburb feel
strongly about the scale and design of homes, the tacky signage of
a chain store, or even the intensive development of open space,
there are a range of legal and regulatory options available. The
primary mechanism, of course, is zoning. Standard zoning tools of
maximum height requirements, setback rules, and floor area
ratios—supplemented by modifications such as “cubic content
ratio”—are readily available to protect against certain changes, so
long as the residents can garner sufficient political support.71
Some communities have also imposed aesthetic zoning
requirements and design review as part of the permitting
process.72 Other powerful existing tools are requirements for
permits for subdivision with associated design conditions,
historical districts, and emerging open-space requirements.73
The “up-scaling” of reasonably stable urban neighborhoods
shares many of the same characteristics of standard new
developments: it alters the current aesthetic and uses norms of a
particular area. The existing land use legal toolkit, however, is
rarely at play to protect community interests. The reasons are
myriad. A simple, but important, difference is scale and
political power. Most of the cities where gentrification has
already occurred or where it is currently underway are fairly
large, and even during the nadir of American cities, most
retained a financial base of middle-class residents, wealthy
residents, and job sources. New York, San Francisco,
Philadelphia, Boston, and Chicago all saw significant decline in
the post-World War II period through the 1970s, but they never
were abandoned to the degree of cities like Detroit, Newark,
71

Needless to say, these zoning devices are subject to the standard
comprehensive plan requirements, and may not be imposed ex post.
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Timothy Bates, McMansions and Geometry of Zoning, 66 PLANNING
COMM’RS J., Spring 2007, at 1, available at http://www.rc.com/documents/McMansions_
and_Geometry_of_Zoning_PCJarticle.pdf.
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See, e.g., THOMAS JEFFERSON PLANNING DIST. COMM’N, DESIGN MANUAL
FOR SMALL TOWNS (Jan. 2004), http://www.tjpdc.org/pdf /rep_comm_designManual.pdf.
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Hartford, or Camden. Accordingly, when “gentrification”
begins—when outsiders with more capital move into abandoned
neighborhoods—the current residents have to counter the
political might of the extant middle class of the city.
In addition, gentrification often does not result in
changed use in the traditional sense. The brownstones or old
Victorian mansions that were used for housing in the pregentrification period are being used for housing now. The
difference is only who is living in the house. The bodegas, small
hardware stores, and social clubs are replaced by other retail
uses—boutiques, upscale restaurants, and cafes. None of these
require zoning changes. This means that in-place residents of
gentrifying neighborhoods lack many of the current land use
controls that others utilize to protect their autonomy, and new
devices are needed to afford that protection.
In-place residents appear to have two separate but
related bases to oppose gentrification: displacement74 and
cultural change that reflects the interests of the incoming
gentrifiers. Displacement of both residents and businesses is a
result of increased demand for housing and commercial space,
which results in higher rental and purchase prices. Cultural
change is caused in part by the newly arriving upscale retail
stores, the loss of long-known retail proprietors, and the
different habits and norms of the gentrifiers. Without access to
existing land use tools, in-place residents must look elsewhere
to address these concerns. But in order for these new devices to
take shape, two threshold matters must be resolved. First,
governments will need to decide what level of gentrification
warrants intervention, and second, they will need metrics to
determine which residents qualify for protection. To the extent
that any intervention requires expenditures, in these budgetary
times, governments will also need to identify sources of funds.
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The literature addressing the harm from the loss of a home is voluminous.
For an overview, see Benjamin Barros, Home as a Legal Concept, 46 SANTA CLARA L.
REV. 255, 279 (2006) (citing e.g., Marc Fried, Grieving for a Lost Home, in THE URBAN
CONDITION 151 (Leonard J. Duhl ed., 1963)) and Mindy Thompson Fullilove,
Psychiatric Implications of Displacement: Contributions from the Psychology of Place,
153 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 1516, 1517 (1996) (“The main proposition presented here is that
the sense of belonging, which is necessary for psychological well-being, depends on
strong, well-developed relationships with nurturing places. A major corollary of this
proposition is that disturbance in these essential place relationships leads to
psychological disorder.”).
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The Gentrification Trigger

The first issue in structuring protection for in-place
residents is how to determine when gentrification is occurring.
The two phenomena most often mentioned are increased
housing and retail prices, and a higher percentage of highincome whites becoming homeowners (although some omit the
racial designation). Needless to say, for constitutional and
other reasons, linking the trigger for gentrification to the
percentage of people of a particular race is a nonstarter. The
same concerns, however, do not apply if the trigger is a
particular increase in prices. For ease of example, I presume
that gentrification occurs when rental and home purchase
prices have increased by 25 percent over a two-year period.
Addressing displacement would be fairly straightforward.
One option is simply to reinstate rent control in its most
stringent form to prevent any further increase in rent. As has
often been argued, however, this regulatory approach has the
effect of imposing all the costs of preserving community interests
on property owners, and it creates other perverse incentives,
where people who could reasonably afford higher rents remain
in apartments they would ordinarily leave, artificially
constricting supply.75
A second option that spreads the cost more evenly, and
which could be more carefully calibrated, would be to issue a
voucher to cover the increased rental costs to all renters able to
establish that they had lived or operated a business in the
neighborhood for a set number of years. Arguably, those
entitled to the voucher would include the grown children of
people who had lived in the neighborhood for the set number of
years, since they would have inherited the home had their
parents been homeowners rather than renters. The voucher
would be available for a set number of years; five years is the
number that is often given when eminent domain is at issue.76
An additional option would be to offer these same residents a
very low-cost guaranteed loan with a minimal down payment to
allow for purchase of a home.77
75

See Richard A. Epstein, Rent Control Revisited: One Reply to Seven Critics,
54 BROOK. L. REV. 1281, 1293-94 (1989).
76
See BECHER, supra note 17, at 291 n.13.
77
While this may seem exceedingly generous, in negotiated redevelopment
plans, residents have been granted “self-amortizing mortgages” for the difference between
the price of their homes and the price of newly built homes. They would gain title and the
new mortgage would be paid in full if the family stayed in the residence. Id. at 253.

336

BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 78:2

Devising the number of years required to receive the
voucher would be challenging. If the goal is to essentially
recognize and compensate for the governmental failures that
resulted in the conditions of the neighborhood deteriorating, a
rather long residential requirement might be warranted. A
long requirement would both reflect the period after which the
government ceased to engage in explicit wrongdoing, and also
recognize those who have truly invested in the neighborhood
through their continued presence.78 In the eminent domain
context, however, tenants who have rented for lesser periods of
time—eight years, in one example—have been eligible for
relocation benefits.79
The rental voucher or low-cost loan would directly address
the displacement concerns. Any long-term resident (or their
children) would have the option of remaining in the neighborhood.
And while perhaps paradoxical, I argue that such a voucher or
loan option should also be transferable out of the neighborhood,
which would offer true choice and autonomy for in-place
residents. When long-term residents or business owners and their
children have choice and autonomy, the anger over any change to
the culture of the neighborhood would seem to be quelled.
Once current residents have a choice of whether to stay
or move, there is the potential for residents to organize and
persuade other residents and business owners to stay. If many
current residents and business owners were to remain, the
retail offerings and street life would likely not change in any
meaningful way. Or if they did, the change would occur on the
residents’ own terms. If too few people stayed, those who
remained might feel a sense of loss but not, presumably, a
sense that outsiders pushed out their neighbors.
If most voucher holders remain, one presumes the
gentrification cycle would either slow down considerably or halt
altogether. Gentrifiers tend to come in waves—artists and
others seeking low rent and an “authentic” community, families
seeking diverse neighborhoods, and then, as amenities follow,
78

See id. Some might argue that such a residency requirement would benefit
only a few and, as I noted earlier, many low-income people relocate fairly frequently—
perhaps due to job demands, or for other reasons. Those who have lived in
neighborhoods like the particular gentrifying neighborhood for the same number of
years would be denied any recompense for the various deteriorated neighborhoods in
which they lived. However, as Becher convincingly argues, we tend to value those who
have invested in their communities—and if this investment is not financial, it may be
time and energy expended. Id. at 9.
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Id. at 291-92.

2013]

PRESERVING AUTONOMY

337

wealthier families whose capital drives the housing costs and
retail demands even higher. If most in-place residents remain,
however, a lack of supply would prevent the subsequent waves.
Although this harms the economic interests of landlords, in
gentrifying neighborhoods, rental properties were among those
that were devalued by the disinvestment and abandonment,
and so landlords would have been able to buy very cheaply
initially, which mitigates any equity concerns.80
B.

Affirmatively Furthering Fair Gentrification

In the Fair Housing Act of 1968, Congress required
HUD and its grantees to do more than combat private housing
discrimination. In recognition of HUD’s own legacy of segregation,
HUD has a mandate to actively promote integration.81 The
obligation to “affirmatively further fair housing” has been
integrated by HUD in its 2010–2015 strategic plan, which
includes the pledge that HUD will operate its programs “with an
eye toward ensuring choice and opportunity for all people
pursuing the promise of a better life.”82 HUD has included these
goals in the criteria by which it will judge applications for
grants from cities and regional development offices.83
Government played a significant role in creating the
conditions that led to the harms of in-place residents; therefore,
government at the city and federal levels ought to lead the
effort to eliminate the aspects of gentrification that generate
the most intense opposition. And given HUD’s mandate, cities
experiencing gentrification have the option of seeking HUD
funds to counter the current dynamic, which continues the
cycle of denying autonomy to residents of urban neighborhoods.
Neighborhoods undergoing gentrification generally
experience significant influxes of private wealth and political
clout. This combination tends to generate increased commercial
activity and governmental services and amenities. If in-place
residents have the financial means to remain, they will ideally be
able to benefit from the employment opportunities, educational
opportunities, and other quality of life improvements that are
80
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precisely the qualities HUD seeks to incentivize in its pursuit of
“Mixed-Income Communities of Opportunity.”84 Accordingly, the
federal government should be encouraged to expend funds to
transform gentrification into a strategy for affirmatively
furthering fair housing, rather than allow it to continue as yet
another racialized dynamic that denies autonomy to the black
and Latino families that remained in neighborhoods that were
hard hit by the policies of last century.
CONCLUSION
In this article, I suggest a modified market model as
among the potential responses to the politically contentious
process of gentrifying neighborhoods. My goal is to illuminate
what true autonomy or choice would look like for in-place
residents of gentrifying neighborhoods and to suggest that
supporting such autonomy should have the result of fulfilling
one of HUD’s underenforced mandates to promote integration.
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